Report NEP-DES-2022-08-29

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Peter Troyan, 2022. "Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism," Papers 2206.11359, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
• Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2022. "An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Item Ascending Auction under Financial Constraints," Discussion Papers 22/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
• Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2022. "Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications," Working Papers halshs-03735747, HAL.
• Xu Lang & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Papers 2207.09253, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
• Morimitsu Kurino & Tetsutaro Hatakeyama, 2022. "Inter-attribute equity in assignment problems: Leveling the playing field by priority design," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2022-009, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.