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The utopia of cooperation: does intra-group competition drive out free riding?

Author

Listed:
  • Annarita Colasante

    (LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • Aurora García-Gallego

    (LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • Andrea Morone

    (LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

  • Tiziana Temerario

    (IVIE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)

Abstract

We study whether intra-group competition fosters cooperation even when cooperate is not a dominant strategy. We arranged an experimental Public Good Game comparing contributions in a risky treatment with contributions in a baseline standard treatment. The intra-group competition was induced by assigning different marginal per capita return (MPCR) in accordance to the size of the contribution itself. Results show that risky MPCR are detrimental for cooperation, while intra-group competition significantly reduces free riding.

Suggested Citation

  • Annarita Colasante & Aurora García-Gallego & Andrea Morone & Tiziana Temerario, 2017. "The utopia of cooperation: does intra-group competition drive out free riding?," Working Papers 2017/08, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    • Handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2017/08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Morone, Andrea & Temerario, Tiziana, 2018. "Is dyads’ behaviour conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 76-85.
    3. Yansong Li & Zhenliang Liu & Yuqian Wang & Edmund Derrington & Frederic Moisan & Jean-Claude Dreher, 2023. "Spillover effects of competition outcome on future risky cooperation," Post-Print hal-04325682, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperation; public good; intra-group competition; uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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