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Procedures vs. Incentives: The Case of the University Promotion System in Italy

Author

Listed:
  • dal Maso, Carlo

    (IMT Lucca)

  • Rettore, Enrico

    (University of Padova)

  • Rocco, Lorenzo

    (University of Padova)

Abstract

A common observation is that individuals strive to neutralize the effect of procedural rules designed to drive choices away from their private optimum. An example of this phenomenon is offered by the reaction of Italian academia to two reforms that modified the procedures of recruitment and promotion, by introducing random selection of the examiners not appointed by the recruiting school and reducing from two to one the number of candidates to be qualified. We model the negotiation occurring within evaluation committees and test the decision rule implied by the theoretical model on the sample composed of all selections to associate and full professorship initiated by the Italian schools of economics between 2004 and 2011. Particularly, we investigate whether these reforms decreased the relative weight of the examiner appointed by the recruiting school on committee's decision. Empirical results suggest that both reforms had little if no effect on examiners' weights.

Suggested Citation

  • dal Maso, Carlo & Rettore, Enrico & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2015. "Procedures vs. Incentives: The Case of the University Promotion System in Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 9386, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9386
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ruben Durante & Giovanna Labartino & Roberto Perotti, 2011. "Academic Dynasties: Decentralization and Familism in the Italian Academia," NBER Working Papers 17572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2015. "Gender Discrimination and Evaluators’ Gender: Evidence from Italian Academia," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(325), pages 162-188, January.
    3. Natalia Zinovyeva & Manuel F. Bagues, 2010. "Does gender matter for academic promotion? Evidence from a randomized natural experiment," Working Papers 2010-15, FEDEA.
    4. Combes, Pierre-Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent & Visser, Michael, 2008. "Publish or peer-rich? The role of skills and networks in hiring economics professors," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 423-441, June.
    5. Pierre-Philippe Combes & Laurent Linnemer & Michael Visser, 2008. "Publish or Peer-rich," Post-Print hal-00558189, HAL.
    6. Manuel F. Bagues & Berta Esteve-Volart, 2010. "Can Gender Parity Break the Glass Ceiling? Evidence from a Repeated Randomized Experiment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1301-1328.
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria De Paola & Michela Ponzo & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2017. "Gender differences in the propensity to apply for promotion: evidence from the Italian Scientific Qualification," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 986-1009.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    negotiation; incentives; university recruitment; formal procedures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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