IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ivi/wpasad/2008-02.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Capacity restriction by retailers

Author

Listed:
  • Ramón Faulí-Oller

    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

A monopolist retailer facing two suppliers producing two symmetric and independent goods improves its bargaining position by commiting to sell only one good. We analyze if this advantage extends to the case where there are two undierentiated retailers competing in the same market. With linear supply contracts, we have partial capacity restriction in the sense that only one retailer commits to sell only one good. Then, we have that if retailers were to merge, welfare would decrease because the merger reduces the variety of goods available to consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramón Faulí-Oller, 2008. "Capacity restriction by retailers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2008-02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2008-02.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2008
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-659, September.
    2. Dana, James D., 2012. "Buyer groups as strategic commitments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 470-485.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Vadym Lepetyuk & Christian A. Stoltenberg, 2013. "Policy Announcements and Welfare," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 962-997, September.
    2. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Joel Sandonis, 2018. "Manufacturer Mergers and Product Variety in Vertically Related Markets," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-24, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fabra, Natalia & Reguant, Mar, 2020. "A model of search with price discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. Ramon Fauli‐Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2021. "Buyer power, product assortment and asymmetric retail formats," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 196-211, April.
    3. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
    4. Jianqiang Zhang & Weijun Zhong & Shue Mei, 2012. "Competitive effects of informative advertising in distribution channels," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 561-584, September.
    5. Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Capacity-Constrained Price Competition When Unit Costs Differ," Discussion Papers 861, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Anindya Ghose & Tridas Mukhopadhyay & Uday Rajan, 2007. "The Impact of Internet Referral Services on a Supply Chain," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 300-319, September.
    7. Li, Chenguang & Sexton, Richard J., 2009. "Impacts of Retailers’ Pricing Strategies for Produce Commodities on Farmer Welfare," 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China 51720, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    8. Oliver Hinz & Jochen Eckert, 2010. "The Impact of Search and Recommendation Systems on Sales in Electronic Commerce," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 2(2), pages 67-77, April.
    9. De los Santos, Babur & Kim, In Kyung & Lubensky, Dmitry, 2018. "Do MSRPs decrease prices?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 429-457.
      • Babur De los Santos & In Kyung Kim & Dmitry Lubensky, 2013. "Do MSRPs Decrease Prices?," Working Papers 2013-13, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    10. Edgardo Arturo Ayala Gaytán, 2009. "Social network externalities and price dispersion in online markets," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(2), pages 1-28, November.
    11. Karle, Heiko & Schumacher, Heiner & Vølund, Rune, 2023. "Consumer loss aversion and scale-dependent psychological switching costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 214-237.
    12. Etienne Gagnon & David López-Salido & Nicolas Vincent, 2013. "Individual Price Adjustment along the Extensive Margin," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 235-281.
    13. Andrew Rhodes & Jidong Zhou, 2019. "Consumer Search and Retail Market Structure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2607-2623, June.
    14. Benaïm, Michel & Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2009. "Learning in games with unstable equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1694-1709, July.
    15. Pedro M. Gardete & Liang Guo, 2021. "Prepurchase Information Acquisition and Credible Advertising," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1696-1717, March.
    16. Blázquez de Paz, Mario, 2018. "Electricity auctions in the presence of transmission constraints and transmission costs," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 605-627.
    17. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
    18. Chang, Yu-Shan & Chiang, Chia-Yu & Liu, Li-Lin (Sunny) & Xie, Xinmei (Lucy), 2019. "Audit partner independence and business affiliation: evidence from Taiwan," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-1.
    19. Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 1995. "Price competition and advertising in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 1075-1088, June.
    20. Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, 2019. "A model of biased intermediation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 854-882, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Retailing; mergers; variety;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2008-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Departamento de Edición (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ievages.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.