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Policy Announcements and Welfare

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Abstract

In the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the public revelation of information about uncertain aggregate outcomes such as policy choices can be detrimental to social welfare. By announcing informative signals on non-insurable aggregate risk, the policy maker distorts agents’ insurance incentives and increases the riskiness of the optimal allocation that is feasible in self-enforceable arrangements. As an application, we consider a monetary authority that may reveal changes in the inflation target, and document that the negative effect of distorted insurance incentives can very well dominate conventional effects in favor for the release of better information.

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  • Vadym Lepetyuk & Christian A. Stoltenberg, 2009. "Policy Announcements and Welfare," NBP Working Papers 65, Narodowy Bank Polski.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:65
    Note: The paper was presented at the National Bank of Poland’s conference “Publishing Central Bank Forecast in Theory and Practice” held on 5–6 November 2009 in Warsaw.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fazio, Dimas M. & Tabak, Benjamin M. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2015. "Inflation targeting: Is IT to blame for banking system instability?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 76-97.
    2. Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2020. "Risk sharing with private and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    3. Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana, 2009. "Anthropometry and Socioeconomics in the Couple: Evidence from the PSID," Working Papers 2009-22, FEDEA.
    4. Roman Horvath, 2020. "Peer Effects in Central Banking," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 68(4), pages 764-814, December.
    5. Broer, Tobias, 2020. "Consumption insurance over the business cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 14579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Piotr Denderski & Christian Stoltenberg, 2015. "On Positive Value of Information in Risk Sharing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-074/VI, Tinbergen Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social value of information; policy announcements; monetary policy; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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