IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ivi/wpasad/2002-27.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Network Formation And Coordination: Bargaining The Division Of Link Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez

    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of the link is not too high, the complete network arises and players coordinate on the same action. If this cost is higher than the risk-dominance premium the efficient action is selected; instead, if it is lower, the risk-dominant action prevails.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2002. "Network Formation And Coordination: Bargaining The Division Of Link Costs," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2002-27.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2002
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    6. Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Galeotti & Miguel Meléndez, 2004. "Exploitation and Cooperation in Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-076/1, Tinbergen Institute.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Feri, Francesco, 2007. "Stochastic stability in networks with decay," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 442-457, July.
    2. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Network Formation with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2005.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS," Working Papers 2009-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Péter Bayer & Ani Guerdjikova, 2020. "Optimism leads to optimality: Ambiguity in network formation," Working Papers hal-03005107, HAL.
    5. Olivier Tercieux & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2006. "A characterization of stochastically stable networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 351-369, October.
    6. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
    7. Edward Cartwright, 2002. "Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000070, David K. Levine.
    8. Francesco Feri & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez, 2013. "Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 955-1000, November.
    9. Zhang, Jin & Cui, Zhiwei & Zu, Lei, 2014. "The evolution of free trade networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 72-86.
    10. Pongou, Roland & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies," MPRA Paper 46021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October.
    12. Pongou, Roland & Serrano, Roberto, 2016. "Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 147-163.
    13. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 397-411.
    14. Carayol, Nicolas & Roux, Pascale & YIldIzoGlu, Murat, 2008. "Inefficiencies in a model of spatial networks formation with positive externalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 495-511, August.
    15. Mathias Staudigl, 2010. "On a General class of stochastic co-evolutionary dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 1001, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    16. Carayol, Nicolas & Roux, Pascale, 2005. "Self-organizing Innovation Networks: When do Small Worlds Emerge?," European Journal of Economic and Social Systems, Lavoisier, vol. 18(2), pages 307-332.
    17. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2001. "Bargaining power in communication networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 69-87, January.
    19. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
    20. Yann Bramoullé & Dunia López-Pintado & Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2004. "Network formation and anti-coordination games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 1-19, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coordination; Nash bargaining solution; Markov process;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Departamento de Edición (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ievages.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.