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Efficiency in a Search and Matching Model with Training Costs

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Abstract

This paper studies the efficiency of the search and matching model with training costs. I incorporate productivity enhancing firm-specific skill training into the search and matching model of Pissarides (2000). I demonstrate that while the decentralized economy can be efficient if training costs are not sunk at the time of wage determination, the decentralized economy is not efficient due to a hold-up problem if training costs are sunk.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroaki Miyamoto, 2011. "Efficiency in a Search and Matching Model with Training Costs," Working Papers EMS_2011_09, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
    • Handle: RePEc:iuj:wpaper:ems_2011_09
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    File URL: https://www.iuj.ac.jp/workingpapers/index.cfm?File=EMS_2011_09.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cheron, A., 2005. "Efficient v.s. equilibrium unemployment with match-specific costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 176-183, August.
    2. Higashi, Youichiro, 2002. "Firm specific human capital and unemployment in a growing economy," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 35-44, January.
    3. José I. Silva & Manuel Toledo, 2013. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: The Role Of Matching Costs Revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 836-843, January.
    4. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2009. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(5), pages 1339-1369, September.
    5. Hiroaki Miyamoto & Yoshimasa Shirai, 2006. "Job Flows And Unemployment In An Equilibrium Unemployment Model With Firm‐Specific Skill Training," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 57(4), pages 547-561, December.
    6. Jan Boone & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2003. "Tax policy in a matching model with training," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 121-147, January.
    7. James M. Malcomson, 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1916-1957, December.
    8. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-849, November.
    9. Hungerbuhler, Mathias, 2007. "Tax progression and training in a matching framework," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 185-200, April.
    10. Silva, José Ignacio & Toledo, Manuel, 2009. "Labor Turnover Costs And The Cyclical Behavior Of Vacancies And Unemployment," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(S1), pages 76-96, May.
    11. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
    12. James M. Malcomson, 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1916-1957, December.
    13. Naoki Shintoyo, 2008. "Creation of jobs and firm-sponsored training in a matching model of unemployment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 145-176, March.
    14. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gavrel, Frédéric & Lebon, Isabelle & Rebière, Thérèse, 2016. "Formal education versus learning-by-doing: On the labor market efficiency of educational choices," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 545-562.
    2. Avcioglu, Sahin & Karabay, Bilgehan, 2019. "Search efficiency, wage dynamics and welfare," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 270-286.
    3. Zhu, Weichao & Wang, Lu & Lang, Youze, 2022. "The costs and benefits of tournament in a frictional labor market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Search and matching model; Efficiency; Training;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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