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On the Use of the Inflation Tax when Non-Distortionary Taxes are Available

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  • Bhattacharya, Joydeep
  • Haslag, Joseph H.

Abstract

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generatior^ model in which money -is valued because of a legal restriction, we show the following: a) a benevolent government may make some use of the inflation t^ in conjunction with a lump-sum income tax on the young, b) the inflation tax will not be used dong with- a lump-sum income tax on the old, and c) the welfare-maximizing monetary policy may-deviate from the Friedman rule (contract the money supply so as to equate the real return on money and other competing stores of value) depending on how fiscal policy is implemented...

Suggested Citation

  • Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph H., 2001. "On the Use of the Inflation Tax when Non-Distortionary Taxes are Available," ISU General Staff Papers 200110010700001052, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:200110010700001052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chari, V. V. & Christiano, Lawrence J. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1996. "Optimality of the Friedman rule in economies with distorting taxes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 203-223, April.
    2. Isabel Correia & Pedro Teles, 1999. "The Optimal Inflation Tax," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(2), pages 325-346, April.
    3. Freeman, Scott, 1987. "Reserve requirements and optimal seigniorage," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 307-314, March.
    4. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph H. Haslag, 2001. "On the Use of the Inflation Tax When Nondistortionary Taxes Are Available," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 823-841, October.
    5. Mulligan, Casey B & Sala-I-Martin, Xavier X, 1997. "The Optimum Quantity of Money: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 687-715, November.
    6. Woodford, Michael, 1990. "The optimum quantity of money," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 20, pages 1067-1152, Elsevier.
    7. Helpman, Elhanan & Sadka, Efraim, 1979. "Optimal Financing of the Government's Budget: Taxes, Bonds, or Money?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 152-160, March.
    8. Click, Reid W, 1998. "Seigniorage in a Cross-Section of Countries," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(2), pages 154-171, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mikko Puhakka, 2005. "Equilibrium dynamics under lump-sum taxation in an exchange economy with skewed endowments," Macroeconomics 0508033, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gupta, Rangan & Makena, Philton, 2020. "Why must it always be so Real with tax evasion?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 304-308.
    3. Rangan Gupta, 2005. "Costly State Monitoring and Reserve Requirements," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(2), pages 263-288, November.
    4. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Helle Bunzel & Joseph Haslag, 2005. "The non-monotonic relationship between seigniorage and inequality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(2), pages 500-519, May.
    5. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph & Russell, Steven, 2005. "The role of money in two alternative models: When is the Friedman rule optimal, and why?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1401-1433, November.
    6. Bittencourt, Manoel & Gupta, Rangan & Makena, Philton & Stander, Lardo, 2022. "Socio-political instability and growth dynamics," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(4).
    7. Ho Wai-Ming, 2020. "Liquidity constraints, international trade, and optimal monetary policy," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-29, June.
    8. Joe Haslag & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Steven Russell, 2003. "Understanding the Roles of Money, or When is the Friedman Rule Optimal, and Why?," Working Papers 0301, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    9. Rangan Gupta, 2011. "Currency Substitution and Financial Repression," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 47-61.
    10. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph H. Haslag, 2001. "On the Use of the Inflation Tax When Nondistortionary Taxes Are Available," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 823-841, October.
    11. Hiraguchi Ryoji, 2017. "Optimal Monetary Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model with Search Theoretic Monetary Exchange," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-14, June.
    12. Rangan Gupta, 2005. "Endogenous Tax Evasion and Reserve Requirements: A Comparative Study in the Context of European Economies," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 328, Society for Computational Economics.
    13. Gupta, Rangan, 2008. "Tax evasion and financial repression," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(6), pages 517-535.
    14. Rangan Gupta, 2005. "A Generic Model of Financial Repression," Working papers 2005-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2005.
    15. Rangan Gupta & Emmanuel Ziramba, 2010. "Optimal public policy with endogenous mortality," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 241-249.
    16. Puhakka, Mikko, 2004. "Equilibrium dynamics under lump-sum taxation in an exchange economy with skewed endowments," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 29/2004, Bank of Finland.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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