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International Charity Under Asymmetric Information

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  • Kilkenny, Maureen
  • Calmette, M.

Abstract

International charity is often subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We show that the burden of informational asymmetries are borne by the most needy countries, even when charities design incentive contracts which limit the rents that some countries can extract.

Suggested Citation

  • Kilkenny, Maureen & Calmette, M., 2001. "International Charity Under Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5112, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5112
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    1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-261, March.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    3. Cashel-Cordo, Peter & Craig, Steven G, 1997. "Donor Preferences and Recipient Fiscal Behavior: A Simultaneous Analysis of Foreign Aid," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 653-671, July.
    4. Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 46-57, March.
    5. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael & Tuomala, Matti, 1994. "Labor Supply and Targeting in Poverty Alleviation Programs," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 8(2), pages 191-211, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessia Isopi & Fabrizio Mattesini, 2009. "Good Donors or Good Recipients? A Repeated Moral Hazard Model of Aid Allocation," Discussion Papers 09/10, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.

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