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Welfare Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Under Asymmetric Spillovers

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  • Kim, Jeong Eon
  • Lapan, Harvey E.

Abstract

We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and several heterogeneous Southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume the southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and use this heterogeneity to study the differing incentives of southern governments to protect intellectual property rights. We find that governments representing more efficient firms have greater incentive to protect IPR than do those representing less efficient firms. However, efficiency considerations imply that, given policies resulting in the same overall innovation rate, it would be better to have weaker IPR protection for the more efficient southern firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Jeong Eon & Lapan, Harvey E., 2004. "Welfare Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Under Asymmetric Spillovers," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12206, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:12206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:econom:v:59:y:1992:i:233:p:35-51 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Yong Yang, 1998. "Why Do Southern Countries Have Little Incentive to Protect Northern Intellectual Property Rights?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 800-816, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    innovation; imperfect competition; commercial policy; intellectual property rights protection; trade;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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