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Does it pay to say “I do”? Marriage bonuses and penalties across the EU

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Abstract

We analyse the different fiscal treatment of married and cohabiting couples across all EU Member States using microsimulation methods. Our paper highlights important differences across EU countries’ tax-benefit systems, where seven countries show substantial bonuses for married couples and four exhibit marriage penalties. On a micro level, we find that these marriage bonuses/penalties differ substantially across household types and income. From a policy point of view, our results suggest that the abolishment of marriage-related tax-benefit components in countries with marriage bonuses would leave some households financially worse off but would increase governments revenues that could be spent to targeted support of specific groups. From both an equity and a gender equality point of view, this abolishment would be desirable.

Suggested Citation

  • CHRISTL Michael & DE POLI Silvia & IVASKAITE-TAMOSIUNE Viginta, 2021. "Does it pay to say “I do”? Marriage bonuses and penalties across the EU," JRC Working Papers on Taxation & Structural Reforms 2021-07, Joint Research Centre.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipt:taxref:202107
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage; cohabitation; marriage penalty; inequality; tax-benefit systems; Europe;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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