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Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes

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  • George von Furstenberg

    (National Science Foundation and Indiana University Bloomington)

Abstract

Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries’ overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.

Suggested Citation

  • George von Furstenberg, 2008. "Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes," CAEPR Working Papers 2008-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    • Handle: RePEc:inu:caeprp:2008005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Overpromising; international agreements; treaty compliance; performance measurement; politics and environment; Kyoto Protocol;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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