The Environment and corruption: Monetary vs. Non-monetary Incentives and the first best
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More about this item
Keywords
Green Technology Subsidy; Brown Tax; Social Status; Non-monetary Incentives; Reputation; Bribe; The first best;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENE-2022-10-24 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2022-10-24 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2022-10-24 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-RES-2022-10-24 (Resource Economics)
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