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Crime and Output: Theory and Application to the Northern Triangle of Central America

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  • Dmitry Plotnikov

Abstract

This paper presents a structural model of crime and output. Individuals make an occupational choice between criminal and legal activities. The return to becoming a criminal is endogenously determined in a general equilibrium together with the level of crime and economic activity. I calibrate the model to the Northern Triangle countries and conduct several policy experiments. I find that for a country like Honduras crime reduces GDP by about 3 percent through its negative effect on employment indirectly, in addition to direct costs of crime associated with material losses, which are in line with literature estimates. Also, the model generates a non-linear effect of crime on output and vice versa. On average I find that a one percent increase in output per capita implies about ½ percent decline in crime, while a decrease of about 5 percent in crime leads to about one percent increase in output per capita. These positive effects are larger if the initial level of crime is larger.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Plotnikov, 2020. "Crime and Output: Theory and Application to the Northern Triangle of Central America," IMF Working Papers 2020/002, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2020/002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. World Bank, 2011. "Crime and Violence in Central America : A Development Challenge - Main Report [Crimen y violencia en Centroamérica: un desafío para el desarrollo (Vol. 1) - Informe principal]," World Bank Publications - Reports 2744, The World Bank Group.
    3. Engelhardt, Bryan & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Rupert, Peter, 2008. "Crime and the labor market: A search model with optimal contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1876-1891, October.
    4. Chien-Chieh Huang & Derek Laing & Ping Wang, 2004. "Crime And Poverty: A Search-Theoretic Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 909-938, August.
    5. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, April.
    6. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
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    Cited by:

    1. Clemens, Michael A., 2021. "Violence, development, and migration waves: Evidence from Central American child migrant apprehensions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
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