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Governance and State-Owned Enterprises: How Costly is Corruption?

Author

Listed:
  • Ms. Anja Baum
  • Clay Hackney
  • Mr. Paulo A Medas
  • Mouhamadou Sy

Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are present in key sectors of the economies around the world. While they can provide an important public service, there is widespread concern that their activities are negatively affected by corruption. However, there is limited cross-country analysis on the costs of corruption for SOEs. We present new evidence on how corruption affects the performance of SOEs using firm level data across a large number of countries. One striking result is that SOEs perform as well as private firms in core sectors when corruption is low. Taking advantage of a novel database reforms, we also show that SOE governance reforms can generate significant performance gains.

Suggested Citation

  • Ms. Anja Baum & Clay Hackney & Mr. Paulo A Medas & Mouhamadou Sy, 2019. "Governance and State-Owned Enterprises: How Costly is Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 2019/253, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2019/253
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Andrea ZATTI, 2021. "Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs): definition, evolution, and evaluation / Context," CIRIEC Studies Series, in: Andrea ZATTI & CIRIEC (ed.), Accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency policies in Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs), volume 2, chapter 0, pages 21-42, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    3. Andrea Zatti, 2022. "Accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency policies in Public owned enterprises (POEs): The case of Italy," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2022(1), pages 43-78.
    4. Jang Ping Thia & Xinyu Kong & Jiaqi Su, 2023. "How Large is the Borrowing Cost Advantage of State-Owned Enterprises?," Review of Development Finance Journal, Chartered Institute of Development Finance, vol. 13(1), pages 92-103.
    5. Andrea ZATTI, 2021. "Introduction," CIRIEC Studies Series, in: Andrea ZATTI & CIRIEC (ed.), Accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency policies in Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs), volume 2, chapter 0, pages 9-19, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    6. Thabang Richard Motswaledi & Jonathan Oshupeng Maseng, 2024. "An Examination of Political Patronage and Maladministration on State-Owned Entities with Specific Reference to South African Airways: A Literature Study," Journal of Politics and Law, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 17(3), pages 1-74, August.

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