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Crisis in Competitive Versus Monopolistic Banking Systems

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Listed:
  • Mr. Bruce D. Smith
  • Mr. Gianni De Nicolo
  • John H. Boyd

Abstract

We study a monetary, general equilibrium economy in which banks exist because they provide intertemporal insurance to risk-averse depositors. A "banking crisis" is defined as a case in which banks exhaust their reserve assets. Under different model specifications, the banking industry is either a monopoly bank or a competitive banking industry. If the nominal rate of interest (rate of inflation) is below (above) some threshold, a monopolistic banking system will always result in a higher (lower) crisis probability. Thus, the relative crisis probabilities under the two banking systems cannot be determined independently of the conduct of monetary policy. We further show that the probability of a "costly banking crisis" is always higher under competition than under monopoly. However, this apparent advantage of the monopoly bank is due strictly to the fact that it provides relatively less valuable intertemporal insurance. These theoretical results suggest that banking system structure may matter for financial stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Bruce D. Smith & Mr. Gianni De Nicolo & John H. Boyd, 2003. "Crisis in Competitive Versus Monopolistic Banking Systems," IMF Working Papers 2003/188, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2003/188
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-864, November.
    3. Mr. Gianni De Nicolo & Ms. Mary G Zephirin & Philip F. Bartholomew & Ms. Jahanara Zaman, 2003. "Bank Consolidation, Internationalization, and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk," IMF Working Papers 2003/158, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1997. "The determinants of banking crises : evidence from industrial and developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1828, The World Bank.
    5. Boyd, John H. & Chang, Chun & Smith, Bruce D., 2002. "Deposit insurance: a reconsideration," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1235-1260, September.
    6. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    7. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2001. "Comparing Financial Systems," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262511258, April.
    8. John H. Boyd & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Sungkyu Kwak & Bruce David Smith, 2014. "A User's Guide to Banking Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 800-892, November.
    9. Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2003. "Bank Concentration and Crises," NBER Working Papers 9921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Bruce D. Smith, 2002. "Monetary Policy, Banking Crises, and the Friedman Rule," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 128-134, May.
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