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Why White, Not Keynes? Inventing the Post-War International Monetary System

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  • Mr. James M. Boughton

Abstract

The international monetary system is largely the product of negotiations during World War II between U.S. and U.K. officials, led respectively by Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes. The design of the system, especially the International Monetary Fund, reflects the U.S. plan much more than the British. That outcome resulted not only from the superior economic position of the United States but also from differences between White's and Keynes's views on key issues. Examination of White's economic papers shows that he was more multilateral than Keynes and placed a higher priority on monetary discipline.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. James M. Boughton, 2002. "Why White, Not Keynes? Inventing the Post-War International Monetary System," IMF Working Papers 2002/052, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2002/052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. D E W Laidler, 2002. "Rules, Discretion and Financial Crises in Classical and Neoclassical Monetary Economics," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 7(2), pages 11-34, September.
    2. James M. Boughton, 2001. "The Case against Harry Dexter White: Still Not Proven," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 219-239, Summer.
    3. Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1989. "Monetary Policy Strategies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 612-632, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ghosh, Atish R. & Ostry, Jonathan D. & Qureshi, Mahvash S., 2018. "Taming the Tide of Capital Flows: A Policy Guide," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262037165, December.
    2. Mr. James M. Boughton, 2006. "American in the Shadows: Harry Dexter White and the Design of the International Monetary Fund," IMF Working Papers 2006/006, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Nabi, Mahmoud Sami & Abdelkafi, Rami & Drine, Imed & Al-Suwailem, Sami, 2015. "Enhancing Intra-Trade in OIC Member Countries Through T-SDRs," Islamic Economic Studies, The Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), vol. 23, pages 101-124.
    4. Pittaluga, Giovanni Battista, 2022. "War and Peace in Keynes' Thought," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 75(4), pages 577-600.
    5. Atish R Ghosh & Jun I Kim & Mahvash S Qureshi, 2020. "What’s in a name? That which we call capital controls," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 35(101), pages 147-208.
    6. Hefeker, Carsten, 2003. "Handels- und Finanz- architektur im Umbruch: Globale Integration und die institutionelle Arbeitsteilung von IWF, Weltbank und WTO," Discussion Paper Series 26158, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
    7. Muchlinski, Elke, 2004. "Kontroversen in der internationalen Währungspolitik: Retrospektive zu Keynes-White-Boughton & IMF," Discussion Papers 2004/1, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    8. Mr. James M. Boughton, 2004. "The IMF and the force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas that Have Shaped the Institution," IMF Working Papers 2004/075, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Cesar Rodrigues van der Laan & André Moreira Cunha & Marcos Tadeu Caputi Lélis, 2017. "On the effectiveness of capital controls during the Great Recession: The Brazilian experience (2007–2013)," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 203-222, April.
    10. Heinz Handler, 2008. "Vom Bancor zum Euro. Und weiter zum Intor?," WIFO Working Papers 317, WIFO.

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