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Growth Slowdown in Bureaucratic Economic Systems: An Issue Revisited

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  • Mr. Aleš Bulíř
  • Ms. Zuzana Brixiova

Abstract

Bureaucratically organized systems tend to be less efficient than economies in which agents are free to choose their output targets, as well as the means to meet them. This paper presents a simple model of planner-manager interactions and shows how bureaucratic economies can end up in a low-effort, low-growth equilibrium even though they may have started in high-effort , high-growth equilibrium. The empirical evidence from eight Central and Eastern European countries during 1948-49 is consistent with our model results, namely, that the growth decline was systemic in nature. The results are applicable to countries in other regions with heavy bureaucratic involvement in the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Aleš Bulíř & Ms. Zuzana Brixiova, 2001. "Growth Slowdown in Bureaucratic Economic Systems: An Issue Revisited," IMF Working Papers 2001/006, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2001/006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Francisca Guedes de Oliveira, 2012. "Empirical Determinants of Government Efficiency: A study Based on Objective Indicators," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 03, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
    2. Paul Frijters & Dirk Bezemer & Uwe Dulleck, 2003. "Socialism, Capitalism, and Transition - Coordination of Economic Relations and Output Performance," Paul Frijters Discussion Papers 2003, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
    3. Zuzana Brixiov?? & Ale?? Bul??r, 2002. "Growth Slowdown Under Central Planning: A Model of Poor Incentives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 448, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Francisca Guedes de Oliveira, 2010. "Evidence on the relation between public capital and Government efficiency," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 01, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.

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