Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types
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Cited by:
- Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010.
"Monopolistic screening under learning by doing,"
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- Dennis Gaertner, 2007. "Monopolistic Screening under Learning By Doing," SOI - Working Papers 0718, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
- Petal Jean Hackett, 2012. "Cutting too Close? Design Protection and Innovation in Fashion Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3716, CESifo.
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