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Banking System Fragility: Likelihood Versus Timing of Failure: An Application to the Mexican Financial Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Mr. Robert Billings
  • Ms. Brenda Gonzalez-Hermosillo
  • Ceyla Pazarbasioglu

Abstract

This paper tests empirically the proposition that bank fragility is determined by bank-specific factors, macroeconomic conditions and potential contagion effects. The methodology allows for the variables that determine bank failure to differ from those that influence banks’ time to failure (or survival rate). Based on the indicators of fragility of individual banks, we construct an index of fragility for the banking system. The framework is applied to the Mexican financial crisis beginning in 1994. In the case of Mexico, bank-specific variables as well as contagion effects explain the likelihood of bank failure, while macroeconomic variables largely determine the timing of failure.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Robert Billings & Ms. Brenda Gonzalez-Hermosillo & Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, 1996. "Banking System Fragility: Likelihood Versus Timing of Failure: An Application to the Mexican Financial Crisis," IMF Working Papers 1996/142, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1996/142
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. José Eduardo Gómez González & Ines Paola Orozco Hinojosa, 2010. "Un modelo de alerta temprana para el sistema financiero colombiano," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 28(62), pages 124-147, June.
    2. Jos� Eduardo Gómez-González, 2012. "Failing and Merging as Competing Alternatives during Times of Financial Distress: Evidence from the Colombian Financial Crisis," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(4), pages 655-671, October.
    3. Michael Halling & Evelyn Hayden, 2008. "Bank failure prediction: a two-step survival time approach," IFC Bulletins chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), The IFC's contribution to the 56th ISI Session, Lisbon, August 2007, volume 28, pages 48-73, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Rüffer, Rasmus, 1999. "Implicit government guarantees and bank herding behavior," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 1999,06, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Hulya Bayir, 2001. "Measuring the Impact of Full Coverage Deposit Insurance Policy in a Probit Model : A Study of the Privately Owned Commercial Banks in Turkey," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 1(1), pages 1-23.
    6. María Soledad Martínez & Sergio Schmukler, 1999. "Do Depositors Punish Banks For "Bad" Behavior?: Examining Market Discipline In Argentina, Chile, And Mexico," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 48, Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Jose E. Gomez-Gonzalez & Nicholas M. Kiefer, 2006. "Explaining time to bank failure in Colombia during the financial crisis of the late 1990s," Borradores de Economia 400, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    8. Valeriya Dinger & Jürgen Von Hagen, 2009. "Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2‐3), pages 491-506, March.
    9. James R. Barth & Sunghoon Joo & Kang‐Bok Lee, 2022. "Bank–client cross‐ownership of bank stocks: A network analysis," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 280-312, June.
    10. José E. Gómez-Gonzalez & Nicholas M. Kiefer, 2009. "Bank Failure: Evidence From The Colombian Financial Crisis," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 3(2), pages 15-31.
    11. Liliana Rojas-Suarez, 2001. "Rating Banks in Emerging Markets: What Credit Rating Agencies Should Learn from Financial Indicators," Working Paper Series WP01-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    12. Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 1999. "Do depositors punish banks for"bad"behavior? : market discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2058, The World Bank.
    13. Meral Varish Kiefer, 2014. "Bank failures and mergers in Turkey: 1992-2014," Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), LAR Center Press, vol. 2(5), pages 31-49, October.

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