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Institutional Designs to Alleviate Liquidity Shortages in a Two- Country Model

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  • Hiroshi Fujiki

    (Associate Director-General and Senior Economist, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: hiroshi.fujiki@boj.or.jp))

Abstract

Fujiki (2003, 2006) extended the Freeman (1996) model to a two- country model, demonstrating that elastic money supplies in foreign exchange markets and the domestic credit market yield efficiency gains in monetary equilibrium, and that several institutional designs equally achieve the desired elastic money supplies. The present paper considers four institutional designs using a model similar to Fujiki (2003): a combination of central bank discount window policy and the CLS Bank; a central bank intervention both in the domestic credit market and the foreign exchange market; cross-border collateral arrangements; and foreign currency liquidity swap lines. These institutional designs yield the same efficiency gains in our model.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroshi Fujiki, 2013. "Institutional Designs to Alleviate Liquidity Shortages in a Two- Country Model," IMES Discussion Paper Series 13-E-07, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    • Handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:13-e-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2003. "A model of the Federal Reserve Act under the international gold standard system," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1333-1350, September.
    2. Freeman, Scott, 1999. "Rediscounting under aggregate risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 197-216, February.
    3. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2006. "Institutions of Foreign Exchange Settlement in a Two-Country Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(3), pages 697-719, April.
    4. Linda S. Goldberg & Craig Kennedy & Jason Miu, 2011. "Central bank dollar swap lines and overseas dollar funding costs," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 17(May), pages 3-20.
    5. Mills, David Jr., 2006. "Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1593-1611, October.
    6. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "The Payments System, Liquidity, and Rediscounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1126-1138, December.
    7. Mark J Manning & Matthew Willison, 2006. "Modelling the cross-border use of collateral in payment systems," Bank of England working papers 286, Bank of England.
    8. James T.E. Chapman & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 651-674, June.
    9. Hiroshi Fujiki, 2013. "Policy Measures to Alleviate Foreign Currency Liquidity Shortages under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 504-536, December.
    10. repec:mcb:jmoncb:v:45:y:2013:i::p:651-674 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign exchange market; CLS; Cross-border collateral arrangements; Liquidity swap lines;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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