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Collateral Crises

Author

Listed:
  • Gary Gorton

    (Yale University and NBER (e-mail: gary.gorton@yale.edu))

  • Guillermo Ordonez

    (Yale University (e-mail: guillermo.ordonez@yale.edu)

Abstract

How can a small shock sometimes cause a large crisis when it does not at other times? Financial fragility builds up over time because it is not optimal to always produce costly information about counterparties. Short-term, collateralized, debt (e.g., demand deposits, money market instruments) -private money- is efficient if agents are willing to lend without producing costly information about the value of the collateral backing the debt. But, when the economy relies on this informationally-insensitive debt, information is not renewed over time, generating a credit boom during which firms with low quality collateral start borrowing. During the credit boom output and consumption go up, but there is increased fragility. A small shock can trigger a large change in the information environment; agents suddenly produce information about all collateral and find that much of the collateral is low quality, leading to a decline in output and consumption. A social planner would produce more information than private agents, but would not always want to eliminate fragility.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordonez, 2011. "Collateral Crises," IMES Discussion Paper Series 11-E-25, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  • Handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:11-e-25
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    File URL: http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/11-E-25.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
    • E20 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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