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Optimization of Customized Pricing with Multiple Overlapping Competing Bids

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  • Dutta, Goutam
  • Natesan, Sumeetha R.

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the case of project procurement where there is a single buyer and multiple sellers who are bidding. We consider one seller having one or more competitors. We formulate the pricing problem from the point of view of one seller having one or multiple competitors (say n). We also assume that based on past experience, we have some idea about the distribution of bid prices of the competitors. We consider uniform distribution to describe the bid price of the competitors. The prices of the competitors are pairwise mutually independent and the price range are either identical or different and overlapping. We consider maximizing the expected contribution. Assuming the contribution as a linear function of price we compute the conditions for maximization of the expected contribution to profit in case of n bidders. Further, we also compare the optimization results with simulation results.

Suggested Citation

  • Dutta, Goutam & Natesan, Sumeetha R., 2016. "Optimization of Customized Pricing with Multiple Overlapping Competing Bids," IIMA Working Papers WP2016-11-02, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:iim:iimawp:14554
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    References listed on IDEAS

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