Mafia, elections and violence against politicians
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- Daniele, Gianmarco & Dipoppa, Gemma, 2017. "Mafia, elections and violence against politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 10-33.
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More about this item
Keywords
Organized crime; political violence; elections; rent seeking;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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