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On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians?

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  • Azam, Jean-Paul

Abstract

Violence against civilians is the mainstay of modern warfare, and claims 84% of the war-related casualties. Looting and terror are the two main reasons why the soldiers victimize the civilians from the other side. However, examples have been found (Congo, Sierra Leone,...) where the guerilla and the incumbent army abuse the civilians from their own side. The present paper offers a potential explanation for this phenomenon, based on strategic looting. It argues that this behavior helps drawing a line between thugs and legitimate rebels. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
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  • Azam, Jean-Paul, 2004. "On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians?," IDEI Working Papers 297, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:2613
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Azam, Jean-Paul, 1992. "The Agricultural Minimum Wage and Wheat Production in Morocco (1971-89)," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 1(2), pages 171-191, August.
    2. Little, I. M. D., 2002. "Ethics, Economics, and Politics: Principles of Public Policy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199257041.
    3. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 127-137, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernd Beber & Christopher Blattman, 2010. "The Industrial Organization of Rebellion: The Logic of Forced Labor and Child Soldiering," HiCN Working Papers 72, Households in Conflict Network.
    2. Christopher Blattman, 2009. "Civil War: A Review of Fifty Years of Research," Working Papers id:2231, eSocialSciences.
    3. Blouin, Max & Pallage, Stéphane, 2016. "Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 18-38.
    4. David Siroky & Valery Dzutsati, 2015. "The Empire Strikes Back: Ethnicity, Terrain, and Indiscriminate Violence in Counterinsurgencies," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(3), pages 807-829, September.
    5. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    6. Pierre-Emmanuel Ly, 2007. "The charitable activities of terrorist organizations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 177-195, April.
    7. Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2018. "Targets of Violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 887-916, March.
    8. Mario Ferrero, 2020. "A theory of revolutionary organizations," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 245-273, September.
    9. Jason Lyall, 2008. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," HiCN Working Papers 44, Households in Conflict Network.

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