IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/618897000000001057.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Slippery Slope of Concession

Author

Listed:
  • Jack Hirshleifer
  • Michele Boldrin
  • David K Levine

Abstract

We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time‐consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which actions may be helpful in such unfortunate circumstances.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jack Hirshleifer & Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2007. "The Slippery Slope of Concession," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001057, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000001057
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/jh_hbl.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Muhamet Yildiz, 2003. "Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 793-811, May.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1991. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 130-134, May.
    4. Ali, S. Nageeb M., 2006. "Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 109-137, September.
    5. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 127-137, Elsevier.
    6. Shavell Steven & Spier Kathryn E., 2002. "Threats Without Binding Commitment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-11, January.
    7. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 251-262, Springer.
    8. Jack Hirshleifer, 2001. "Appeasement: Can It Work?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 342-346, May.
    9. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676.
    2. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2015. "Political Economy in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(5), pages 1038-1086.
    4. Yared, Pierre, 2010. "A dynamic theory of war and peace," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1921-1950, September.
    5. Serhat Doğan & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 233-257, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
    2. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2016. "Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 461-496, July.
    3. Eso, Peter & Wallace, Chris, 2016. "Persuasion and Pricing : Dynamic Trading with Hard Evidence," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 24, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    4. Matthew Backus & Thomas Blakee & Brad Larsen & Steven Tadelis, 2020. "Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(3), pages 1319-1361.
    5. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1998. "Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 685-701, November.
    6. Arturo Bris & Ivo Welch, 2005. "The Optimal Concentration of Creditors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2193-2212, October.
    7. Dan Usher, 2001. "Mysterious Bargaining," Working Paper 1001, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    8. Christopher Tyson, 2010. "Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(3), pages 457-477, June.
    9. Antill, Samuel & Grenadier, Steven R., 2019. "Optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice: Dynamic bargaining versus liquidation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 198-224.
    10. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2017. "Endogenous Destruction In Conflict: Theory And Extensions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 479-500, January.
    11. Hernando Zuleta & Juanita Villaveces, 2008. "Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach," Documentos de Trabajo 5148, Universidad del Rosario.
    12. Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2012. "Technology of military conflict, military spending, and war," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 226-236.
    13. Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, 1996. "The Legal Battle," UCLA Economics Working Papers 749, UCLA Department of Economics.
    14. Attila Ambrus & Shih En Lu, 2015. "A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 208-249, February.
    15. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 115-128.
    16. S Nageeb Ali & B Douglas Bernheim & Xiaochen Fan, 2019. "Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(2), pages 500-525.
    17. Garoupa, Nuno R & Gata, Joao E, 2002. "A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 41-65, January.
    18. Li Duozhe & Wong Yat Fung, 2009. "Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-14, April.
    19. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Martin Wittenberg, 2008. "To Prey Or Not To Prey? Welfare And Individual Losses In A Conflict Model1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 76(2), pages 239-265, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000001057. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.