IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecinqu/v45y2007i3p592-601.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rent Seeking And Democracy: Empirical Evidence For Uruguay

Author

Listed:
  • CÉSAR CALDERÓN
  • ALBERTO CHONG

Abstract

We provide evidence for Granger causality between rent‐seeking behavior and democracy in Uruguay, where both rent‐seeking behavior and political shifts have varied widely in the past 80 yr but ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and inequality have remained low. This helps identify “pure” interactions and their link with rent‐seeking outcomes. The presence and duration of democracy appear to have been conducive to a decrease in rent seeking, although the reduction in rent seeking does not appear to have had a bearing on the quality of democratic regime. While the duration of democratic regime may impact rent‐seeking behavior, rent seeking also displays a Granger causality to democratic duration. (JEL O10, O1)

Suggested Citation

  • César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2007. "Rent Seeking And Democracy: Empirical Evidence For Uruguay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 592-601, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:45:y:2007:i:3:p:592-601
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00023.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00023.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00023.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Martín Rama, 1994. "Endogenous Trade Policy: A Time‐Series Approach," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 215-232, November.
    3. repec:bla:kyklos:v:42:y:1989:i:4:p:515-32 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Alberto Chong & Luisa Zanforlin, 2004. "Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 335-361, February.
    5. Clague, Christopher & Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen & Olson, Mancur, 1996. "Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 243-276, June.
    6. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross‐Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
    7. Taylor, Alan M., 1998. "On the Costs of Inward-Looking Development: Price Distortions, Growth, and Divergence in Latin America," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-28, March.
    8. Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 2001. "Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 67-72, May.
    9. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators," MPRA Paper 23118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, March.
    11. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    12. Amelung, Torsten, 1989. "The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 42(4), pages 515-532.
    13. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Iqbal, Nasir & Daly, Vince, 2014. "Rent seeking opportunities and economic growth in transitional economies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 16-22.
    2. Zohal Hessami & Silke Uebelmesser, 2016. "A political-economy perspective on social expenditures: corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 71-100, February.
    3. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:3-41 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2006. "Rent Seeking and Democracy in Latin America: What Drives What?," Research Department Publications 4435, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2006. "Búsqueda de rentas y democracia en América Latina: ¿Qué impulsa a qué?," Research Department Publications 4436, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?," Research Department Publications 4415, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Alberto Chong & Luisa Zanforlin, 2004. "Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 335-361, February.
    5. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?," Research Department Publications 4416, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    6. Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Henrik Hansen & Finn Tarp, 2004. "On The Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(496), pages 191-216, June.
    7. Karam, Fida & Zaki, Chahir, 2019. "Why Don’t MENA Countries Trade More? The Curse of Deficient Institutions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 56-77.
    8. Ahmet Faruk Aysan & …mer Faruk Baykal & Marie-Ange Véganzonès–Varoudakis, 2011. "The Effects of Convergence in Governance on Capital Accumulation in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Countries," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland (ed.), Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Ahmet Faruk AYSAN & Mustapha Kamel NABLI & Marie‐Ange VÉGANZONÈS‐VAROUDAKIS, 2007. "Governance Institutions And Private Investment: An Application To The Middle East And North Africa," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 45(3), pages 339-377, September.
    10. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    11. Pettersson, Jan, 2003. "Democracy, Consolidation and Growth," Research Papers in Economics 2002:16, Stockholm University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Dec 2004.
    12. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Sekkat, Khalid, 2022. "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: how long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 429-443, June.
    13. Natkhov, T. & Polishchuk, L., 2017. "Political Economy of Institutions and Development: The Importance of Being Inclusive. Reflection on "Why Nations Fail" by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Part I. Institutions and Economic Devel," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 12-38.
    14. Simplice A. Asongu & Oasis Kodila-Tedika, 2018. "Determinants of Property Rights Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 9(4), pages 1291-1308, December.
    15. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Katsuyuki Naito & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2017. "Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 115-142, January.
    16. Carl Henrik Knutsen, 2012. "Democracy and economic growth: A survey of arguments and results," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 393-415, December.
    17. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2007. "Inequality and Institutions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 454-465, August.
    18. Tidiane KINDA & Patrick PLANE & Marie-Ange VEGANZONES-VAROUDAKIS, 2008. "Firm-Level Productivity and Technical Efficiency in MENA Manufacturing Industry: The Role of the Investment Climate," Working Papers 200819, CERDI.
    19. Gounder, Rukmani, 2003. "Effectiveness of Globalization: A Case Study of Fiji," Sri Lankan Journal of Agricultural Economics, Sri Lanka Agricultural Economics Association (SAEA), vol. 5, pages 1-23.
    20. Tidiane Kinda & Patrick Plane & Marie-Ange Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2009. "Productivity and Investment Climate in Developing Countries: How Do MENA Industries Perform?," Working Papers 476, Economic Research Forum, revised Mar 2009.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:45:y:2007:i:3:p:592-601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.