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Reforma del sector social en América Latina y el papel de los sindicatos

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  • Daniel Maceira
  • Maria Victoria Murillo

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza la reacción de los sindicatos magisteriales y los gremios médicos a una serie de reformas del sector social en la región, incluidos la descentralización, mecanismos de pago a los prestadores de servicios y la introducción de mecanismos de evaluación del desempeño y de prestación privada de servicios. Combina la obra publicada sobre Economía y Politología para comprender las condiciones que moldean diversos patrones de comportamiento de los sindicatos y sus efectos en la aplicación de las políticas. El trabajo sugiere que las principales condiciones que influyen en el comportamiento de los sindicatos en el sector de la salud tienen que ver con la estructura del mercado (tamaño y nivel de competencia), debido a la participación combinada del sector privado y el público en el empleo. En la educación, donde el sector público es la principal fuente de empleo, los alineamientos políticos y las características organizacionales de las asociaciones magisteriales también desempeñan un papel importante para explicar el comportamiento de las organizaciones prestadoras de esos servicios. Se concluye, tomando en cuenta la naturaleza exógena de la mayoría de estas variables, presentando algunas sugerencias de políticas para alinear los objetivos de los sindicatos y los de los diseñadores de políticas mediante reformas de la normativa.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Maceira & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2001. "Reforma del sector social en América Latina y el papel de los sindicatos," Research Department Publications 4276, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4276
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