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The Welfare Effects of including Household Preferences in School Assignment Systems: Evidence from Ecuador

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  • Elacqua, Gregory
  • Jacas, Isabel
  • Krussig, Thomas
  • Méndez, Carolina
  • Neilson, Christopher

Abstract

We study the welfare produced by a coordinated school assignment system that is based exclusively on minimizing distance to schools, comparing the matches it produces to a system that includes household preferences using a deferred acceptance algorithm. We leverage administrative data and a mechanism change implemented in the city of Manta, Ecuador in 2021 to estimate household preferences and show that considering applicant preferences produces large welfare gains. Our counterfactual exercises show that differences across alternative assignment mechanisms are small. Survey data on household beliefs and satisfaction support these conclusions. The evidence indicates that coordinated school choice and assignment systems can have large welfare effects in developing country contexts.

Suggested Citation

  • Elacqua, Gregory & Jacas, Isabel & Krussig, Thomas & Méndez, Carolina & Neilson, Christopher, 2022. "The Welfare Effects of including Household Preferences in School Assignment Systems: Evidence from Ecuador," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12625, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:12625
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004676
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Adam J. Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2020. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1274-1315, May.
    2. Christopher A. Neilson, 2021. "Targeted Vouchers, Competition Among Schools, and the Academic Achievement of Poor Students," Working Papers 2021-48, Princeton University. Economics Department..
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    4. Parag A. Pathak, 2011. "The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 513-536, September.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; centralized student assignment; school choice; Ecuador;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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