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A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values

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  • Sergiu Hart

Abstract

Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergiu Hart, 2003. "A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values," Discussion Paper Series dp338, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp338
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    File URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/abs/3ntu-val.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sergiu Hart, 2005. "An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 355-366, September.
    2. Geoffroy de Clippel & Hans Peters & Horst Zank, 2004. "Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative Games in Strategic Form," Discussion Paper Series dp484, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Andrés Salamanca, 2020. "A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 195-225, March.
    3. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002205, David K. Levine.
    4. Barry O'Neill, 2014. "Networks of Rights in Conflict: A Talmudic Example," Discussion Paper Series dp677, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Zhigang Cao, 2011. "Remarks on Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Discussion Paper Series dp565, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    6. Chaowen Yu, 2013. "A Comparison of NTU values on a Certain Class of Games," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2012-041, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    7. Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2008. "Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 190(3), pages 659-671, November.
    8. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 46-52, January.
    9. Thomas F. Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2012. "A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement," NBER Working Papers 18495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "The Consistent Coalitional Value," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 832-851, November.
    11. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2010. "The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 137-150, March.
    12. Zhigang Cao, 2013. "Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 337-358, July.
    13. Lejano, Raul P., 2011. "A note on solution concepts for nontransferable utility games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 777-780.
    14. Roger A McCain, 2013. "Value Solutions in Cooperative Games," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8528, September.

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