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An Efficiency-Wage Theory of the Weather

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  • Barro, Robert J.

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  • Barro, Robert J., 1989. "An Efficiency-Wage Theory of the Weather," Scholarly Articles 3451295, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:3451295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Friedman, David, 1987. "Cold Houses in Warm Climates and Vice Versa: A Paradox of Rational Heating," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1089-1097, October.
    2. Carmichael, Lorne, 1985. "Can Unemployment Be Involuntary? Comment [Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1213-1214, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Novy-Marx, Robert, 2014. "Predicting anomaly performance with politics, the weather, global warming, sunspots, and the stars," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 137-146.

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