IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hit/hitcei/2000-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Further Reforms after the "BIG BANG": The Japanese Government Bond Market

Author

Listed:
  • Rhee, S. Ghon

Abstract

This paper identifies key steps for further development of the JGB market in aligning its infrastructures with those of the U.S. and U.K. government securities markets. One major impediment to the JGB market development is commingled management of government assets and liabilities. Especially Fiscal Investment and Loan Program's inadvertent influence over monetary policy not only causes the cost of government-issued debt to increase but also creates serious impediments to the development of the JGB markets. Therefore, it is recommended that Ministry of Finance's involvement in the JGB market should be limited to issuer's function in the capacity of government debt manager and a "hands-off" policy be adopted by the Ministry of Finance to give all FILP agencies complete autonomy. Additional reform measures are recommended to create a more efficient and effective JGB market: (i) promote JGBs with non-resident investors; (ii) introduce the primary dealer system; (iii) adopt the uniform-price auction method; (iv) allow when-issued trading; (v) develop a truly American-style REPO market; and (vi) introduce STRIPS.

Suggested Citation

  • Rhee, S. Ghon, 2000. "Further Reforms after the "BIG BANG": The Japanese Government Bond Market," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-3, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2000-3
    Note: March 2000; Revised: June 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/13964/wp2000-3a.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
    2. Robert A. Feldman & Rajnish Mehra, 1993. "Auctions: Theory and Applications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(3), pages 485-511, September.
    3. Daniel Heller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The auctions of Swiss government bonds: should the Treasury price discriminate or not?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Mr. Garry J. Schinasi & T. Todd Smith, 1998. "Fixed-Income Markets in the United States, Europe, and Japan-Some Lessons for Emerging Markets," IMF Working Papers 1998/173, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Marcel Cassard & Mr. D. F. I. Folkerts-Landau, 1997. "Risk Management of Sovereign Assets and Liabilities," IMF Working Papers 1997/166, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
    7. Bank for International Settlements, 1999. "Market Liquidity: Research Findings and Selected Policy Implications," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 11, december.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rhee, S. Ghon, 2001. "Further Reforms of the JGB Market for the Promotion of Regional Bond Markets," CEI Working Paper Series 2001-14, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Keunkwan Ryu & Gyung-Rok Kim & Seonghwan Oh, 2004. "Discriminatory vs Uniform Price Auction: Auction Revenue," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 539, Econometric Society.
    3. Walter Orellana Rocha & Bernardo X. Fernández Tellería & Vladimir Fernández Quiroga, 2006. "Subasta electrónica interactiva y subasta a sobre cerrado: Un análisis comparativo de los resultados en Bolivia," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 9(1), pages 65-113, December.
    4. Paul Castillo & Carlos Montoro & Vicente Tuesta, 2006. "Estimación de la tasa natural de interés para la economía peruana," Monetaria, CEMLA, vol. 0(3), pages 261-298, julio-sep.
    5. Rodolfo Guerrero & José Luis Negrín, 2006. "Eficiencia del sistema bancario mexicano 1997-2004: una estimación dinámica," Monetaria, CEMLA, vol. 0(3), pages 235-259, julio-sep.
    6. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "Mexican treasury securities primary auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000025, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016. "Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution," Working Papers on Finance 1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    8. Song, Zhaogang & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2018. "Quantitative easing auctions of Treasury bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 103-124.
    9. Matti Keloharju & Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist, 2003. "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions," Working Papers 2003.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. repec:awi:wpaper:0460 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Michał Krawczyk, 2009. "Demand functions in Polish Treasury auctions," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 40(4), pages 31-49.
    12. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions : Evidence from Cross-Border Capacity Auctions," Working Papers 2007-27, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    13. Klenio Barbosa & Dakshina De Silva & Liyu Yang & Hisayuki Yoshimoto, 2019. "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue," Working Papers 267027285, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    14. Keloharju, Matti & Malkamäki, Markku & Nyborg, Kjell G. & Rydqvist, Kristian, 2002. "A Descriptive analysis of the Finnish treasury bond market 1991-1999," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2002, Bank of Finland.
    15. Monostori, Zoltán, 2013. "Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók [Discriminatory and uniform-price auctions]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1048-1074.
    16. Erwann SbaÏ & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
    17. Kentaro Kawasaki & Takeshi Fujie & Kentaro Koito & Norikazu Inoue & Hiroki Sasaki, 2012. "Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(2), pages 157-179, June.
    18. Damianov, Damian S. & Oechssler, Jörg & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2010. "Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 60-76, January.
    19. Boo‐Sung Kang & Steven L. Puller, 2008. "The Effect Of Auction Format On Efficiency And Revenue In Divisible Goods Auctions: A Test Using Korean Treasury Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 290-332, June.
    20. Dentler, Alexander & Rossi, Enzo, 2024. "Public debt management announcements: A welfare-theoretic analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    21. Longstaff, Francis A & Han, Bing & Merrill, Craig, 2004. "Revenue Implications of Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auction Designs: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Buyback Auctions," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt7344v866, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2000-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Reiko Suzuki (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cehitjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.