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Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace

Author

Listed:
  • Mounu Prem

    (School of Economics, Universidad del Rosario. Calle 12C No. 4-69, Bogota)

  • Andrés F. Rivera

    (School of Economics, Universidad del Rosario. Calle 12C No. 4-69, Bogota)

  • Dario A. Romero

    (Department of Economics, Columbia University. 1022 International Affairs Building, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027)

  • Juan F. Vargas

    (School of Economics, Universidad del Rosario. Calle 12C No. 4-69, Bogota)

Abstract

Incomplete peace agreements may inadvertently increase insecurity if they trigger violent territorial contestation. We study the unintended consequences of the Colombian peace process and find that the permanent ceasefire declared by the FARC insurgency during peace negotiations with the government triggered a surge in the targeting of local community leaders. Leaders were killed by armed groups excluded from the peace process to thwart collective action and civilian mobilization, thus consolidating their dominance in formerly FARC-controlled areas. These results are exacerbated in places with judicial inefficiency and where peasants dispossessed during the conflict have started administrative process to reclaim their land.

Suggested Citation

  • Mounu Prem & Andrés F. Rivera & Dario A. Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2019. "Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace," HiCN Working Papers 289, Households in Conflict Network.
    • Handle: RePEc:hic:wpaper:289
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    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The Art of Winning a Peace Agreement: The Case of the FARC
      by ? in Political Violence at a Glance on 2019-09-16 12:00:53

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    Cited by:

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    2. Lucas Marín Llanes, 2020. "Unintended Consequences of Alternative Development Programs: Evidence From Colombia's Illegal Crop Substitution," Documentos CEDE 18468, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Prem, Mounu & Saavedra, Santiago & Vargas, Juan F., 2020. "End-of-conflict deforestation: Evidence from Colombia’s peace agreement," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    4. Cantillo, Tatiana & Garza, Nestor, 2022. "Armed conflict, institutions and deforestation: A dynamic spatiotemporal analysis of Colombia 2000–2018," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    5. Samper, Juan Antonio & Krause, Torsten, 2024. "“We fight to the end”: On the violence against social leaders and territorial defenders during the post-peace agreement period and its political ecological implications in the Putumayo, Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    6. Ana Maria Diaz & Luz Magdalena Salas & Ana María Tribín-Uribe, 2020. "Hidden benefits of peace: The case of sexual violence," Borradores de Economia 1124, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    7. Ladino, Juan Felipe & Saavedra, Santiago & Wiesner, Daniel, 2021. "One step ahead of the law: The net effect of anticipation and implementation of Colombia’s illegal crops substitution program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    8. Gabriela Rubio, 2020. "¿Fin de la guerra, fin de la violencia? Evidencia del Acuerdo de Paz y homicidios en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 18228, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    9. Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin & Nelson A. Ruiz & Juan F. Vargas, 2021. "The Real Winner's Curse," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 52-68, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social leaders; Peace process; Armed conflict; Territorial control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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