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Tax Competition and Economic Geography

Author

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  • Forslid, Rikard

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

  • Andersson, Fredrik

    (Lund University)

Abstract

Tax competition between two countries is considered in a trade- and-location setting with differentiated products and monopolistic competition. There are two groups of workers, mobile ones and immobile ones. Taxes are used for producing a public good. It is shown that an equilibrium with mobile workers dispersed across countries is destabilised by increased taxes on these mobile workers|and this is shown to be true also for perfectly coordinated tax increases. It is also shown that an agglomeration is taxable, and that increasing public spending may relax the minimum tax pressure on immobile workers consistent with preserv-ing an agglomeration.

Suggested Citation

  • Forslid, Rikard & Andersson, Fredrik, 1999. "Tax Competition and Economic Geography," Research Papers in Economics 2000:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2000_0005
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    JEL Classi¯cation: F12; F15; F21; R12 agglomeration; economic geography; tax competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)

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