Leader, Or Just Dominant? The Dominant-Firm Model Revisited
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
dominant…firm; monopoly with fringe; sequential moves;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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