IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/bjposi/v38y2008i01p1-15_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

In Praise of Manipulation

Author

Listed:
  • DOWDING, KEITH
  • VAN HEES, MARTIN

Abstract

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the ‘sincerity argument’, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the ‘transparency’ argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

Suggested Citation

  • Dowding, Keith & Van Hees, Martin, 2008. "In Praise of Manipulation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-15, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:38:y:2008:i:01:p:1-15_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S000712340800001X/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    2. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
    3. Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    4. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting," Papers 2106.11502, arXiv.org.
    5. Stensholt, Eivind, 2021. "Faithful accounting in MMP-elections," Discussion Papers 2021/7, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    6. Nicholas R. Miller, 2019. "Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 113-124, April.
    7. Stensholt, Eivind, 2023. "MMP-Elections: Equal Influence and Controlled Assembly Size," Discussion Papers 2023/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    8. Nuñez, M. & Valletta, G., 2012. "The information simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    9. Edgardo Bucciarelli & Andrea Oliva, 2020. "Arrow’s impossibility theorem as a special case of Nash equilibrium: a cognitive approach to the theory of collective decision-making," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 19(1), pages 15-41, June.
    10. Hugh Ward & Albert Weale, 2010. "Is Rule by Majorities Special?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 26-46, February.
    11. Stensholt, Eivind, 2015. "What Happened in Burlington?," Discussion Papers 2015/26, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    12. Bobrowski, Jakub & Łaska, Grażyna, 2023. "Using spatial elimination and ranking methods in the renewable energy investment parcel search process," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 285(C).
    13. Brian Kogelmann, 2017. "Aggregating out of indeterminacy," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 16(2), pages 210-232, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:38:y:2008:i:01:p:1-15_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jps .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.