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Pairwise Kidney Exchange with Blood-Group Incompatibility

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Abstract

Kidney transplants across the blood-group barrier are medically feasible even if blood-group compatibility is preferred from a medical point of view. However, these types of transplants are motivated by the fact that they help in increasing the number of kidney transplants with living donors. This paper investigates priority matchings in a pairwise kidney exchange problem where blood-group incompatibilities may be present. As a priority matching not necessarily is unique, it is from a medical point of view natural to select a priority matching where the number of blood-group compatible exchanges is maximized among all priority matchings. The main result demonstrates that this can be achieved by solving an appropriately defined maximum weight matching problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Andersson , Tommy, 2015. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange with Blood-Group Incompatibility," Working Papers 2015:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2015_002
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    File URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp15_2.pdf
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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    2. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2004. "Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 257-279, January.
    3. Okumura, Yasunori, 2014. "Priority matchings revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 242-249.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    pairwise kidney exchange; priority matchings; blood-group incompatibility.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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