The Choice of Entry by Greenfield or Takeover
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- Borsos-Torstila, Julianna, . "The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Operations of Finnish MNCs in Transition Economies 1990-1995," ETLA A, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, number 28, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
Greenfield; Takeover; Entry choice;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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