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Trade costs and the timing of competition policy adoption

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  • Rikard Forslid
  • Jonas Häckner
  • Astri Muren

Abstract

This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competing à la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented. Ce mémoire présente certains résultats qui suggèrent comment le moment choisi pour adopter une politique de concurrence est co‐reliéà la taille du pays. Les petits pays tendent à adopter des politiques de concurrence plus tard. On présente un modèle théorique avec des pays de tailles différentes, qui ont aussi des coûts de commerce différents, et où les firmes se concurrencent à la Cournot. On montre que la réduction des coûts de commerce qui suit une mondialisation croissante affecte les pays d'une manière différente selon leur taille. Cela a des implications pour les incitations à mettre en place une politique de concurrence. Les prédictions du modèle sont consistantes avec les régularités empiriques observées.

Suggested Citation

  • Rikard Forslid & Jonas Häckner & Astri Muren, 2011. "Trade costs and the timing of competition policy adoption," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(1), pages 171-200, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:44:y:2011:i:1:p:171-200
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01628.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Naoto Jinji & Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2014. "Strategic Investment Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 490-501, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)

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