IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/bergec/2004_013.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Synergies and non-discriminatory access pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Hagen, Kåre P.

    (NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION)

  • Hansen, Bjørn

    (Telenor)

  • Vagstad, Steinar

    (University of Bergen, Department of Economics)

Abstract

According to the new European telecom regulation, incumbent operators are required to provide access to such bottlenecks on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. We explore different interpretations of this general rule in a model in which the bottleneck can be used by external (to the bottleneck firm) as well as internal service providers, and also derive some properties of the solution to the bottleneck owner’s maximization problem as well as that of a welfare-maximizing regulator. In particular, we derive an ECPR rule that also corrects for synergies. Next, by imposing certain symmetry requirements we establish a benchmark in which the external service provider is a competitive fringe and internal and external end-users face identical prices and buy identical quantities of the two services. This, we argue, can be dubbed a non-discrimination benchmark. We then show that introducing certain synergies makes the bottleneck want to favour external supply, while making the fringe less competitive has the opposite implication.

Suggested Citation

  • Hagen, Kåre P. & Hansen, Bjørn & Vagstad, Steinar, 2004. "Synergies and non-discriminatory access pricing," Working Papers in Economics 13/04, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:bergec:2004_013
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ekstern.filer.uib.no/svf/2004/13-04.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 65-88.
    2. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, 1999. "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California’s Electricity Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 285-323, September.
    3. Amundsen, E.S. & Mortensen, J.B., 2001. "The Danish Green Certificate System: Some Simple Analytical Results," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 226, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    4. Jensen, S. G. & Skytte, K., 2002. "Interactions between the power and green certificate markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 425-435, April.
    5. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Mortensen, Jorgen Birk, 2001. "The Danish Green Certificate System: some simple analytical results," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 489-509, September.
    6. Torstein Bye, 2003. "On the Price and Volume Effects from Green Certificates in the Energy Market," Discussion Papers 351, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    7. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Mortensen, Jorgen Birk, 2002. "Erratum to "The Danish Green Certificate System: some simple analytical results": [Energy Economics 23 (2001) 489-509]," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 523-524, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Nese, Gjermund, 2004. "Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets: The case of Green Certificates," Working Papers in Economics 14/04, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    2. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Nese, Gjermund, 2002. "Provision of renewable energy using green certificates: market power and price limits," MPRA Paper 10558, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Reinhard Madlener & Weiyu Gao & Ilja Neustadt & Peter Zweifel, 2008. "Promoting renewable electricity generation in imperfect markets: price vs. quantity policies," SOI - Working Papers 0809, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    4. Dressler, Luisa, 2016. "Support schemes for renewable electricity in the European Union: Producer strategies and competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 186-196.
    5. Nagl, Stephan, 2013. "Prices vs. Quantities: Incentives for Renewable Power Generation - Numerical Analysis for the European Power Market," EWI Working Papers 2013-4, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    6. Unteutsch, Michaela, 2014. "Redistribution Effects Resulting from Cross-Border Cooperation in Support for Renewable Energy," EWI Working Papers 2014-1, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    7. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Nese, Gjermund, 2004. "Market Power in Interactive Environmental and Energy Markets: The case of Green Certificates," MPRA Paper 10559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Eirik S. Amundsen & Gjermund Nese, 2016. "Market Power in Interactive Environmental and Energy Markets: The Case of Green Certificates," CESifo Working Paper Series 5922, CESifo.
    9. Ciarreta, Aitor & Espinosa, Maria Paz & Pizarro-Irizar, Cristina, 2017. "Optimal regulation of renewable energy: A comparison of Feed-in Tariffs and Tradable Green Certificates in the Spanish electricity system," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 387-399.
    10. Torstein Bye & Annegrete Bruvoll, 2008. "Multiple instruments to change energy behaviour: The emperor's new clothes?," Discussion Papers 549, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    11. Arild Heimvik & Eirik S. Amundsen, 2019. "Prices vs. percentages: use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 7521, CESifo.
    12. Paul Koutstaal & Michiel Bijlsma & Gijsbert Zwart & X. van Tilburg, 2009. "Market performance and distributional effects on renewable energy markets," CPB Document 190.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    13. Mulder, Peter & de Groot, Henri L.F., 2013. "Dutch sectoral energy intensity developments in international perspective, 1987–2005," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 501-512.
    14. Pablo del Río González, 2007. "The interaction between emissions trading and renewable electricity support schemes. An overview of the literature," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 12(8), pages 1363-1390, October.
    15. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Nese, Gjermund, 2006. "Integratation of Tradable Green Certificate Markets: What can be expected?," MPRA Paper 10628, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2013. "A reexamination of renewable electricity policy in Sweden," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 57-63.
    17. Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder & Nese, Gjermund, 2016. "Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets: The case of green certificates," Working Papers in Economics 04/16, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    18. Schusser, Sandra & Jaraitė, Jūratė, 2018. "Explaining the interplay of three markets: Green certificates, carbon emissions and electricity," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    19. Lüthi, Sonja & Wüstenhagen, Rolf, 2012. "The price of policy risk — Empirical insights from choice experiments with European photovoltaic project developers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1001-1011.
    20. Lintunen, Jussi & Kangas, Hanna-Liisa, 2010. "The case of co-firing: The market level effects of subsidizing biomass co-combustion," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 694-701, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    access regulation; discrimination; ECPR; synergies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:bergec:2004_013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kjell Erik Lommerud (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iouibno.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.