IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/halshs-03502611.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strict Liability Vs Negligence: Is Economic Efficiency A Relevant Comparison Criterion?

Author

Listed:
  • Gérard Mondello

    (UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

The efficiency criterion (the highest care level at the lowest accident cost) indisputably governs the comparison of performance between strict liability and negligence. This view stems from the standard accident model development in the 70's and the 80's that ensures under ideal conditions, the equivalence between regimes and assume their potential substitutability. We develop a more general accident model (under risk universe) with divergent views among the parties about the damage. It follows that efficiency is no longer a relevant criterion. liability regimes belong to specific fields: Ultra-hazardous activities for strict liability and the remaining areas of negligence.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Mondello, 2021. "Strict Liability Vs Negligence: Is Economic Efficiency A Relevant Comparison Criterion?," Working Papers halshs-03502611, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03502611
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03502611
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03502611/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Steven Shavell, 1982. "On Liability and Insurance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 120-132, Spring.
    3. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    4. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1996. "Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 191-210, April.
    5. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    6. Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2007. "A Unilateral Accident Model under Ambiguity," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 431-477, June.
    7. Daniel Ellsberg, 1961. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 75(4), pages 643-669.
    8. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wang Shaohua, 2020. "Research of Economic Theory of Liability on Food Industry," Academic Journal of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy Bucharest,"Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University Bucharest, vol. 6(3), pages 122-126, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gérard Mondello, 2016. "The Negligence Rule Specificity under Radical Uncertainty," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-32, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    2. L. A. Franzoni, 2016. "Optimal liability design under risk and ambiguity," Working Papers wp1048, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    3. Gérard Mondello, 2017. "Un modèle d'accident unilatéral: incertitude non-radicale et estimations différenciées," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-12, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    4. Gérard Mondello, 2022. "A General Accident Model for Risky Activities," GREDEG Working Papers 2022-12, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Apr 2023.
    5. Chateauneuf, Alain & Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon, 2007. "Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 538-567, November.
    6. Calford, Evan M., 2020. "Uncertainty aversion in game theory: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 720-734.
    7. Péter Bayer & Ani Guerdjikova, 2020. "Optimism leads to optimality: Ambiguity in network formation," Working Papers hal-03005107, HAL.
    8. repec:ubc:pmicro:halevy-04-10-29-10-08-43 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Adam Dominiak & Wendelin Schnedler, 2011. "Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 289-312, October.
    10. Milos Borozan & Loreta Cannito & Barbara Luppi, 2022. "A tale of two ambiguities: A conceptual overview of findings from economics and psychology," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 6(S1), pages 11-21, July.
    11. Jian Yang, 2015. "Game-theoretic Modeling of Players' Ambiguities on External Factors," Papers 1510.06812, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2017.
    12. Nathalie Chappe & Raphaël Giraud, 2013. "Confidence, Optimism and Litigation: A Litigation Model under Ambiguity," Working Papers hal-04287896, HAL.
    13. Gérard Mondello, 2012. "The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A " Trompe l'œil " Perspective," Post-Print hal-00727223, HAL.
    14. repec:awi:wpaper:0469 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Roman Kozhan & Michael Zarichnyi, 2008. "Nash equilibria for games in capacities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 321-331, May.
    16. Gérard Mondello, 2013. "Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories"," Post-Print halshs-00929948, HAL.
    17. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
    18. Aflaki, Sam, 2013. "The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 240-253.
    19. Lo, Kin Chung, 2006. "Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-22, January.
    20. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2021. "The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 417-454, May.
    21. Lo, Kin Chung, 2009. "Correlated Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 722-743, March.
    22. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2009. "Ambiguity and social interaction," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 355-379, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strict Liability; Unilateral Accident Model; Negligence Rule; Ultra-hazardous activities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03502611. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.