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Dynamic Consistency and Expected Utility with State Ambiguity

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  • Antoine Billot

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas)

  • Vassili Vergopoulos

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

While models of ambiguity are reputed to generate a basic tension between dynamic consistency and the Ellsberg choices, this paper identifies a third implicit ingredient of this tension, namely the parsimony rule, which enforces each state of nature to encode a well-defined unique observation. This paper then develops nonparsimonious interpretations of the state space to make the Ellsberg choices compatible with both expected utility and dynamic consistency. The state space may contain nonobservable states: a state is allowed to encode more than one observation, a pattern called state ambiguity. The presence of such ambiguous states motivates an explicit distinction between the decision-maker and the theory-maker, the latter designing the state space and eliciting the former's preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Billot & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2014. "Dynamic Consistency and Expected Utility with State Ambiguity," Working Papers halshs-01006698, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01006698
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01006698
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    References listed on IDEAS

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