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Fiabilité des tests génétiques et architecture des contrats d'équilibre

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  • Mouhamadou Fall

    (GERSEG - Groupe d'Etude et de Recherche en Sciences Economiques - UGB - Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis Sénégal, LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR7322] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The genetic tests spread in almost all the domains of the society. However, several authors following the example of Penacino and al. (2003) pull the alarm bell and draw the attention on the deceptive results that the genetic tests can engender. On the insurance market, the lack of reliability of the genetic tests is sometimes one of the reasons evoked by the insurers to go without the genetic information. In our analysis, we show that the use of the genetic tests, even with a lack of reliability, will not prevent the insurance market from working well. First of all, we characterized the insurance market. Because of the error on a test, the low-risk agents keep present in the spirit that they have a chance to be high-risk agent and the high-risk agents the hope to have a chance to be good risk. Consequently, the market will consist of pessimistic low-risk agents and optimistic high-risk agents. Then, we tried to determine contracts offered on the market. When the insurer has no same faiths as the agents, the offered contracts can go of a pooling contract to a menu of partial insurance contracts. On the other hand, if the insurer has the same faiths as the policyholders, he offers to the optimists a full insurance contract and at the pessimists a contract with partial coverage. The full insurance contract of the optimists is however different from the full insurance contract of Stiglitz (1977 ) in the sense that the agents have a higher utility.

Suggested Citation

  • Mouhamadou Fall, 2012. "Fiabilité des tests génétiques et architecture des contrats d'équilibre," Working Papers halshs-00751861, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00751861
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00751861
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    References listed on IDEAS

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