Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0396-x
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- Meglena Jeleva & Bertrand Villeneuve, 1997. "Insurance Contracts with Imprecise Probabilities and Adverse Selection," Working Papers 97-16, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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Cited by:
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015.
"Pessimistic information gathering,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01156552, HAL.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Post-Print halshs-01156552, HAL.
- Anwar, Sajid & Zheng, Mingli, 2012. "Competitive insurance market in the presence of ambiguity," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 79-84.
- Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022.
"Optimal Random Taxation and Redistribution,"
SciencePo Working papers Main
hal-03915336, HAL.
- Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal random taxation and redistribution," IFS Working Papers W22/35, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal Random Taxation and Redistribution," Working Papers hal-03915336, HAL.
- Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018.
"Price discrimination with loss averse consumers,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 681-728, May.
- Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2016. "Price Discrimination with Loss Averse Consumers," Working papers 2016rwp-97, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
- Corina Birghila & Tim J. Boonen & Mario Ghossoub, 2020. "Optimal Insurance under Maxmin Expected Utility," Papers 2010.07383, arXiv.org.
- Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
- Shi-jie Jiang & Feiyun Xiang & Iris Yang, 2023. "Effect of Prevention Focus on the Relationships Among Driving Accident History, Risk Perception, and Consumers’ Automobile Insurance Coverage Decisions," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(3), pages 21582440231, July.
- Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello & Alba Roviello, 2024. "On Hurwicz Preferences in Psychological Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-26, July.
- Eberhard Feess & Cathrin Jordan & Ilan Noy, 2022. "Insurance for Catastrophes - Indemnity vs. Parametric Insurance with Imperfect Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 9631, CESifo.
- Kostas Koufopoulos & Roman Kozhan, 2016. "Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 659-687, October.
- Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Mimra, Wanda, 2023.
"Adverse selection in insurance,"
Working Papers
23-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Nathalie Fombaron & Georges Dionne & Wanda Mimra, 2023. "Adverse Sélection in Insurance," Post-Print hal-04416340, HAL.
- Mouhamadou Fall, 2012. "Fiabilité des tests génétiques et architecture des contrats d'équilibre," Working Papers halshs-00751861, HAL.
- Cheung, Ka Chun & Phillip Yam, Sheung Chi & Yuen, Fei Lung & Zhang, Yiying, 2020. "Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 155-165.
- Arnold Chassagnon & Bertrand Villeneuve, 2005.
"Optimal risk-sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 955-978, August.
- Arnold Chassagnon & Bertrand Villeneuve, 2005. "Optimal risk‐sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(3), pages 955-978, August.
- Arnold Chassagnon & Bertrand Villeneuve, 2005. "Optimal risk-sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception," Post-Print halshs-00754069, HAL.
- DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005.
"Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2005054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005. "Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Emir Kamenica & Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard Thaler, 2011. "Helping Consumers Know Themselves," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 417-422, May.
- Martimort, David & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mingli Zheng & Chong Wang & Chaozheng Li, 2016. "Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection When the Insurer Has Ambiguity about the Composition of the Consumers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 17(1), pages 179-206, May.
- Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
- Mario Ghossoub, 2016. "Optimal Insurance with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Disagreement about Zero-Probability Events," Risks, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, August.
- Sandroni, Alvaro & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Overconfidence and asymmetric information: The case of insurance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 149-165.
- Arthur Snow, 2015. "Monopolistic Insurance and the Value of Information," Risks, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-13, July.
- Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012.
"Adverse selection in insurance contracting,"
Working Papers
12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
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Keywords
Imprecise probabilities; Insurance markets; Adverse selection.;All these keywords.
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