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Currency Board enjeux, mécanismes et limites

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  • Moustapha Aman

    (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 - Université Gustave Eiffel)

Abstract

Résumé Cette communication se donne pour objectif d'étudier les enjeux qui sous-tendent l'adoption d'un Currency Board. La recherche prend appui sur la revue de littérature des Currency Boards à travers les fondements théoriques. Le Currency Board est un régime monétaire dont la recherche de la crédibilité fait reposer la régulation monétaire sur un mécanisme automatique d'ajustement et non sur une action discrétionnaire de la Banque Centrale pourtant bénéfique au maintien de la solidité bancaire. En ce sens, les contraintes de financement et d'ajustement induites par le Currency Board apparaissent difficilement soutenables pour les banques commerciales. Ceci peut produire des effets nécessitant le besoin des marges discrétionnaires contradictoire avec les principes fondateurs du Currency Board. Ce document pourra être complété par une analyse au cas par cas (selon le pays) pour montrer dans quelle mesure le Currency Board est-il viable sans prêteur en dernier ressort. Mots-clés : Banque Centrale, Currency Board, contrainte de financement, mécanisme d'ajustement, système bancaire. Abstract This paper's objective is to study the issues underlying the adoption of a Currency Board. The research builds on the literature review of Currency Boards through the theoretical foundations. The Currency Board is a monetary regime of which looking for monetary credibility commits to base monetary regulation on an automatic mechanism and not on a discretionary action of the Central Bank, however beneficial for maintaining bank soundness. In this sense, funding constraints and adjustment induced by the Currency Board appear with difficulty bearable for commercial banks. This can produce effects that require the discretionary margins inconsistent with the founding principles of the currency board. This paper can be completed by a case-by-case analysis (depending on country) to show in which measure the Currency Board is viable without a lender of last resort.

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  • Moustapha Aman, 2020. "Currency Board enjeux, mécanismes et limites," Working Papers hal-02975186, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02975186
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02975186
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    References listed on IDEAS

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