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[Set up of young people as farmers in France : future prospects and contractual policy efficiency]
[L'installation des jeunes agriculteurs en France : perspectives d'évolution et efficacité d'une politique contractuelle]

Author

Listed:
  • Catherine C. Benjamin

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Yves Le Roux
  • Euan Phimister

    (University of Aberdeen)

Abstract

De nombreux instruments sont mobilisés pour inciter à l'installation : l'attribution de la DJA (Dotation Jeune Agriculteur) est l'élément central du dispositif mis en oeuvre depuis plusieurs années. Ce document apporte un éclairage sur la politique d'aide à l'installation des jeunes agriculteurs, en analysant ce dispositif en tant que politique contractuelle entre l'Etat et les agriculteurs, et en examinant l'efficacité de celle-ci ainsi que les avantages comparés des instruments de régulation qui pourraient être mobilisés.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine C. Benjamin & Yves Le Roux & Euan Phimister, 1998. "[Set up of young people as farmers in France : future prospects and contractual policy efficiency] [L'installation des jeunes agriculteurs en France : perspectives d'évolution et efficacité d'une p," Working Papers hal-02837749, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02837749
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02837749
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