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De la standardisation à la normalisation de la gestion médicalisée à l'hôpital : L’apport de la méthode de compensation structurelle et conjoncturelle

Author

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  • Caryn Mathy

    (LATEC - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Techniques Economiques [UMR 5601] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Catherine Quantin

    (DIM - Service Biostatistiques et Informatique Médicale (CHU de Dijon) - CHU Dijon - Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Dijon - Hôpital François Mitterrand)

  • Maryse Gadreau

    (LATEC - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Techniques Economiques [UMR 5601] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Utilization of GHM in budget allocation leads to a reduction of strategic behaviors and restores equity between hospitals. However, heterogeneousness of GHM, with subgroups, is also generating perverse effects. The contractual economical analysis, applied to the statistical modelization of Quantin et al. (1995), underlines how the opportunist behaviors can be reduced. As the PMSI is almost unanimously adopted and considered as an irreversible investment, this approach generates questions on ways to improve the tool. The ultimate goal is to move from standardized costs to normalized (optimized) costs for maximum efficiency of the tool. Finally, this statistical analysis generates a financial tool for budgetary allocation policy, a tool of financial management for hospitals staff or a planification tool for regional health policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Caryn Mathy & Catherine Quantin & Maryse Gadreau, 1996. "De la standardisation à la normalisation de la gestion médicalisée à l'hôpital : L’apport de la méthode de compensation structurelle et conjoncturelle," Working Papers hal-01527279, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01527279
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01527279
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
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