The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
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More about this item
Keywords
Adverse selection; moral hazard; risk aversion; prudence;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2016-12-04 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2016-12-04 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
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