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Vers un système de vote plus juste ?

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Gonzalez Suitt

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Axel Guyon

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Thibault Hennion

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Rida Laraki

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, IMJ - Institut de Mathématiques de Jussieu - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Xavier Starkloff

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Sophie Thibault

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Benjamin Favreau

    (X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

Ce document de Recherche a été réalisé dans le Cadre du Projet Scientifique Collectif, un travail de recherche d'une année dans le cycle d'ingénieur de l'Ecole Polytechnique. Profitant des échéances électorales des années 2011 et 2012 (la primaire citoyenne de l'automne 2011 et l'élection présidentielle d'Avril 2012), nous avons étudié en conditions réelles certains systèmes de vote. Ces systèmes de vote étaient mis en avant par les publications scientifiques, qui s'intéressaient pour la plupart à leur étude théorique uniquement. Le choix du système de vote pour une élection revêt une importance fondamentale, dans la mesure où il détermine le caractère de la campagne qui sera menée par les candidats. Selon la façon dont les électeurs devront exprimer leurs opinions, le résultat d'une élection peut être modifié, car les différents systèmes de vote ne privilégient pas les mêmes facteurs. Nous avons donc recueilli en conditions réelles les bulletins de vote, pour étudier les caractéristiques techniques des systèmes de vote. Ces critères, comme le caractère robuste du résultat auquel le vote conduit, ou la possibilité d'en manipuler le résultat par un vote insincère, ont été abondamment décrits dans la littérature. Ce travail de recherche s'intéressera dans un premier temps à une revue de la littérature et à la description des différents systèmes de vote. Il exposera ensuite les deux expériences menées au cours de l'année 2011-2012, et analysera les résultats qui en seront obtenus. Enfin il dénombrera les difficultés pratiques rencontrées lors des expériences et conclura sur la pertinence des différents systèmes de vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Gonzalez Suitt & Axel Guyon & Thibault Hennion & Rida Laraki & Xavier Starkloff & Sophie Thibault & Benjamin Favreau, 2014. "Vers un système de vote plus juste ?," Working Papers hal-01061100, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01061100
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01061100
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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