Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-00972867
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Other versions of this item:
- Talia Bar & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 227-255, August.
- Talia Bar & Sidartha Gordon, 2013. "Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers hal-00972867, HAL.
- Talia Bar & Sidartha Gordon, 2013. "Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00972867, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018.
"Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
- Christopher Cotton & Raphael Boleslavsky, 2015. "Limited Capacity In Project Selection: Competition Through Evidence Production," Working Paper 1343, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2021. "A Model of Challenge Funds: How Funding Availability and Selection Rigor Affect Project Quality," Working Paper 1470, Economics Department, Queen's University.
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More about this item
Keywords
adverse selection; information acquisition; mechanism design; project selection; limited liability; R&D.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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